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1.  Introduction
In March 2007 the Japanese Foreign Ministry published a leaﬂet titled “Japan-Chi-
na Relations enter a New Era—Two Countries separated only by a narrow strip of 
water.”  One picture displayed in this publication shows the former Japanese Foreign 
Minister Aso¯ Taro¯ and his Chinese counterpart Li Zhaoxing happily shaking hands. 
When reading this publication, one could think that the relations between the neigh-
bouring countries have risen to an all-time high.  But the truth is that Japan-China re-
lations took much damage during the Koizumi Administration, which Yang Bojiang 
calls a “lost half-decade for Sino-Japanese Relations.” 1)  The relations of the two Asian 
great powers are recovering only slowly.  The two nations seem to be separated by a 
lot more than a only a narrow strip of water.
The entire Northeast Asian region remains a highly sensible area to date, even 
though the dark prophecy foretold by Aaron L. Friedberg in his article “Ripe for rival-
ry” 2) has not yet fulﬁlled itself.
The three major powers of the region, Japan, China and Russia, have competing in-
terests, while a forth power, the United States, is also deeply involved in the region. 
The divided Korean peninsula, the status of Taiwan and the fact that North Korea has 
displayed its nuclear capabilities adds additional potential for conﬂict to the region.
During the past years, a considerable discrepancy between the economic and secu-
rity relations in the region has evolved.  The economic ties between the nations in 
Northeast Asia have been strong throughout the years and are still growing.  The trade 
volume between China and Japan exceeded $200 billion in 2006, making China Ja-
pan’s most important trade partner.  Since China is also South Korea’s leading trade 
partner, it has now overtaken the United States in both countries.
But the economic cooperation did not have a signiﬁcant impact on security rela-
tions.  The security ties in Northeast Asia remain traditionally weak.  The countries 
have failed to develop any multilateral defense mechanisms like the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO).3)  Japan and South Korea for example rely on the Unit-
ed States for their security but have not managed to develop a trilateral alliance.
Especially the relations between the main actors of the region, Japan and China, re-
main difﬁcult to date.  Japan’s history still looms large over relations with its neigh-
bors.  During the Koizumi administration, frequent visits to Yasukuni Shrine as well as 
the textbook issue led to ill feelings in China and South Korea, bringing the relations 
to a new low.  Several unresolved territorial conﬂicts in the region regularly ﬂare up 




and make the region even more unstable.  And above all that, a new wave of national-
ism is sweeping across Northeast Asia, adding additional difﬁculty to cooperation in 
security matters.
Experiences with such an anarchic environment have shown that Conﬁdence Build-
ing Measures (CBMs) as well as Track Two diplomacy can be useful tools for building 
up mutual trust.  While CBMs were widely used in Europe during the Cold War, for 
example between NATO and the Warsaw Pact or through the Organization for Secu-
rity and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), they only were introduced in Northeast 
Asia after the end of the bipolar rivalry.  During the Cold War, with a closed pre-Deng 
Xiaoping China and the large Soviet threat, the security environment in the region did 
not permit CBMs.  But even ten years after the end of the Cold War, CBMs are only 
slowly being established in Northeast Asia.
This essay examines the role of CBMs between Japan and China.  After giving a 
brief overview over the security environment of the two countries as well as the stum-
bling blocks in Sino-Japanese relations, it describes the CBMs that have taken place 
and gives suggestions for further measures.
2.  Security Environment
2.1.  China
China has always been at the center of Asia, not only through its geographical posi-
tion but also through its inﬂuence.  Although it has had its ups and downs, since 1990 
China appears to be on track again.  Its phenomenal economic development over the 
past years has left the world in awe, making China one of the key actors in Northeast 
Asia.  Alongside its economic development lies its military spending, which has signiﬁ-
cantly increased in the past decades.  Since 1989, Chinese defense expenditures have 
increased by an average of 14.5 percent each year.4)  China’s total defense expenditure 
is hard to pin down, mainly because the Chinese military has sources of revenue that 
are not stated in the ofﬁcial budget.  Today China is one of the top military spenders 
in the region, even overtaking Japan in the process.5)  Although the People’s Libera-
tion Army (PLA) is still far from being a high-tech army, it has been considerably 
modernized through the acquisition of weapons-technology from Russia and through 
advances in domestic production.  However, in certain areas the PLA still lacks capa-
bilities, especially in its naval forces, which do not yet possess a single aircraft carrier.6)
China’s relationships with most of its neighbours, with the exception of Japan, 
North Korea, and Taiwan, have never been better.  Because of the settlement of bor-
der disputes and its engagement in Asian multilateral institutions, “most nations now 
see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a non-
threatening regional power.” 7)  Yet there are still a number of security concerns on 
China’s political agenda.
Preventing Taiwan’s independence remains Beijing’s number one security concern. 
As stated in China’s defense white paper of 2006, Taiwan’s struggle for independence 
still poses a great threat to China’s territorial integrity.
Also, the unstable situation on the Korean peninsula, intensiﬁed through the missile 
ﬁrings and the nuclear test Pyongyang conducted in 2006, poses a dilemma for Bei-
jing.  On the one hand, China has reduced its aid in order to display its displeasure 
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with Pyongyang’s actions.  On the other hand, China does not want to see a collapse 
of North Korea, which would only further destabilize the region.  A reuniﬁcation of 
the two Koreas would mean that a major ally of the United States would share a bor-
der with China, a scenario Beijing has no desire to witness.
But Japan remains one of China’s greatest security concerns.  The modernization of 
the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) and the expanding role of the SDF is the cause 
of great unease in Beijing.  In China’s view, Japans “military posture is becoming more 
external-oriented.” 8)
China also views the strengthening of the United States-Japan alliance with great 
suspicion, a fact that is also stated in its defense White Paper 2006.  Therein, China 
also expressed its suspicion concerning both Japan’s constitutional revisionism as well 
as Japan’s pursuit of a right to collective self-defense.  What also worries China is the 
fact that the alliance has sought to broaden its scope and include new countries such 
as India and Australia.  A joint military exercise undertaken in September 2007 off the 
coast of Myanmar, an ally of China, caused unease in Beijing.
And ﬁnally, the possibility of a Japan armed with nuclear weapons is a nightmare 
scenario for China.  Japan possesses the technology and even the plutonium to build 
such weapons.  When in September 2006 several inﬂuential Japanese politicians start-
ed a debate on whether Japan should adapt nuclear arms, this was viewed with suspi-
cion in China and South Korea.9)
2.2.  Japan
Japan’s security policy has undergone profound changes since the mid 1990s.  Its 
endeavour to remove post-war restrictions on the SDF and play a more inﬂuential role 
in global security affairs has become evident through several adjustments in its nation-
al defense strategy.10)
Since its defeat in World War II, Japan has relied on the United States-Japan alli-
ance for security.  During the Cold War, this alliance was quite asymmetrical, with the 
United States providing the offensive “sword” in Northeast Asia while Japan acted as a 
defensive “shield,” supporting the power projection of the United States in the re-
gion.11)  Relying on the concept of comprehensive security and withheld by constitu-
tional restraints, Japan has focused more on tools such as ODA and other economic 
engagement and diplomacy in order to achieve its goals rather than resorting to mili-
tary power.
But since the end of the Cold War, there have been a number of changes regarding 
Japans security policy.  When Japan refused to send troops to Iraq during the ﬁrst Gulf 
War in 1990–91 and instead supported the Western coalition ﬁnancially, a wave of 
criticism swept over Japan and its “checkbook diplomacy.”  Hence, one of the ﬁrst 
changes after the Gulf War was the International Peace Keeping Law passed in 1992, 
which allowed Japan’s Self Defense Forces ( JSDF) to embark on non-combat United 
Nations peacekeeping missions.  Since then, Japan has taken part in several peace-
keeping missions, for example in Rwanda and East Timor.
The second major change in Japans security policy occurred in the wake of the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, when the Bush administration called on its allies in the 
war against terror.  Japan, having learned its lesson from the ﬁrst Gulf War, responded 
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promptly, passing several laws that allowed the deployment of troops to Afghanistan 
and even to Iraq, which was the ﬁrst mission of SDF troops to a combat region since 
the end of World War II.  These laws and Japan’s engagement have further strength-
ened the United States-Japan alliance, even if these activities where outside the geo-
graphic scope of the alliance.  Japan and the United States also worked closely togeth-
er in bringing relief to the victims of the tsunami in 2005.  And ﬁnally, the decision of 
Japan to join the United States in constructing a theater missile defense system and the 
joint effort to develop such a technology has also been a key aspect of the alliance.  In 
short, “Japan’s role in the alliance expanded signiﬁcantly as Tokyo moved from proté-
gé to partner.” 12)
Because of Japan’s new post-September 11 security role, the SDF have been mod-
ernized.  The traditional Cold War-style forces have been exchanged for a lighter and 
qualitatively strengthened army, with newly won abilities like airborne refuelling mak-
ing the forces more ﬂexible and better ﬁtted for the tasks of the twenty-ﬁrst century.13)
Japan taking a more active role in the alliance and also pursuing a more active se-
curity policy during the last few years is also due to the number of security threats 
confronting Japan, the most immediate being North Korea.  Pyongyang’s actions have 
led to a deep feeling of insecurity and distrust and made North Korea Tokyo’s number 
one security threat.  The ﬁring of a Taepodong missile over Japan in 1998 and the nu-
clear tests in 2006 have all increased this feeling of insecurity.
But China’s rise also poses a major challenge for Japan.  China was called a direct 
threat to Japanese security for the ﬁrst time in the Defense Guidelines of 2004.  Since 
then, the aforementioned increase in Chinas military capabilities, especially its naval 
force and its ballistic weapons, alongside the lack of transparency concerning military 
aspects, have increased suspicion in the eyes of many analysts and is also mentioned 
in Japan’s Defense White Book of 2007.14)  The fact that China destroyed one of its 
own satellites in January 2007 led to doubts about China’s intentions concerning the 
use of space technology.
The security concerns that exist between Japan and China are mutual.  But these 
security concerns are further enhanced by a row of stumbling blocks that have made 
the relations even more difﬁcult.
2.3.  Stumbling Blocks in Sino-Japanese Relations
The relations between the two historical great powers of Asia have always had their 
ups and downs, but have come to a new low during the Koizumi administration.  Sev-
eral factors taint the relations of the two countries, a few of which will be dealt with in 
the following section.
2.3.1.  History
History has always played an important role in the Sino-Japanese relations and has 
“an enduring impact on the perceptions, policies and future outlook of both sides.” 15) 
Japan’s past aggression towards China and the fact that in the eyes of the Chinese peo-
ple and government Japan has never dealt with its past in a satisfactory way, has had 
an important inﬂuence on the relationship between the two countries.  China, on the 
other hand, plays out the “history card” whenever it comes in handy, although Beijing 
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has been more careful with this issue since President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Tokyo in 
1998, where his constant mentioning of the history issue caused a backlash.
During the Koizumi administration, several actions of the government brought up 
the history issue and caused further deterioration of the relations between Japan and 
its neighbours.
The prime minister’s regular visits to Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan’s war dead, in-
cluding fourteen Class A war criminals, are honored, caused major annoyance 
amongst Chinese and Koreans during his term.  Although former prime ministers also 
visited the shrine, Koizumi was the ﬁrst to continue his visits despite major protests 
from South Korea and China.16)  These visits not only upset the public in China and 
Korea, but also made China refuse to have summit meetings with Koizumi.  Koizumi’s 
successor, Abe Shinzo¯, although known to have a “hawkish” attitude, refrained from 
visiting the shrine during his short term in order to improve overall relations with Ja-
pan’s neighbors.  Also, since it became public that Emperor Hirohito was in fact dis-
pleased with the enshrining of the Class A war criminals in 1979, a new debate on 
possibly enshrining these souls elsewhere has commenced.
Another historical stumbling block is the history book issue.  In 2005, major anti-
Japanese demonstrations where staged in several Chinese cities when the Tokyo Board 
of Education approved a history textbook that in the eyes of many Chinese down-
played aspects of the Paciﬁc War.  This was not the ﬁrst time a Japanese history book 
had drawn intense criticism from the Chinese public, the ﬁrst incident dating to 1982.
And ﬁnally, the unearthing of chemical weapons left behind by the Imperial Army 
in China also raises the history issue on a regular basis.  In 2003 and 2004, several 
Chinese workers were injured when they unearthed canisters of mustard gas that 
stemmed from the Imperial Army.  When Japan initially refused to compensate the 
victims, this led to anti-Japanese protests once more.17)
All these aspects “make it difﬁcult for many Chinese to recognize the fundamental 
changes which have taken place in post-1945 Japan and to trust Japan’s intentions.” 18) 
On the other hand, China has used Japan’s guilt to its advantage and to pursue its na-
tional interests.  This has led to the Japanese public becoming more and more an-
noyed with how China plays out the guilt card at its will.  The history issue causes an 
atmosphere of distrust in both countries.  Resolving it would help bilateral relations 
enormously.  Prime Minster Abe’s successor Fukuda Yasuo is known to be an oppo-
nent of Yasukuni Shrine visits.
2.3.2.  Territorial Conﬂicts
Territorial conﬂicts can be a heavy burden for the relationship between two coun-
tries.  This also is the case for Japan and China, where the dispute over the Senkaku 
Islands has been on the political agenda of the two countries for several decades.
The Senkaku Islands, which are called Diaoyutai in Chinese, are a group of unin-
habited islands and barren rocks which lie approximately 120 nautical miles northeast 
of Taiwan and 185 nautical miles southeast of Okinawa.  Although China has pro-
duced several historical records that state that China was the ﬁrst nation to discover 
these islands, they where incorporated into Japanese territory in 1895.  Japan re-
mained the owner of the Senkaku Islands until 1951, when the San Francisco Peace 
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Treaty gave the United States full administrative power over them.  They where given 
back to Japan alongside Okinawa in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty of 1972.  Since a 
United Nations commission published a survey in 1968 in which the possibility of 
large oil and gas reserves in the area of the islands was mentioned, the PRC and Tai-
wan have claimed that the islands belong to their territory.  Since that time, the 
conﬂict has ﬂared up on a regular basis.19)
One of the most serious crises occurred in 1996, when a Japanese ultra-rightwing 
organization travelled to the disputed islands in order to repair a lighthouse.  As Japan 
had also just ratiﬁed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
and declared an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the islands, this led to mas-
sive protests in China and Taiwan.  When a group of Chinese activists attempted to 
land on one of the islands, they where stopped by the Japanese Coast Guard.  In the 
course of the altercation one Chinese activist drowned.  This is the usual pattern of 
this dispute: Either Japanese right wing organizations travel to the island and trigger 
the anger of the Chinese, or Chinese activists try to invade the islands and are held up 
by Japanese forces.  The issue also ﬂared in 2003 and 2004, when Chinese activists ac-
tually managed to land on one of the islands and were arrested by Japanese police 
forces, which led to massive protests from the PRC’s government and to violent out-
breaks of anti-Japanese demonstrations in China.
Although the oil reserves in the area make the islands attractive for energy-hungry 
China and Japan, the material factors alone cannot explain the duration of the dispute. 
It seems that ideational factors, for example, the symbolic value of the islands, also 
play an important role in the dispute.  To resolve the Senkaku question would mean a 
great improvement in overall Sino-Japanese relations.
Closely connected to the Senkaku issue is the question of the demarcation of the 
EEZ in the East China Sea.  While China uses the natural prolongation method to 
support its claims, Japan uses the principle of a median line.  Both methods are sup-
ported by UNCLOS.  This leads to overlapping claims of the two countries in the East 
China Sea.  Incursions of Chinese research vessels and even warships into Japan’s 
EEZ have further increased the Sino-Japanese tensions in past years.20)
2.3.3.  Nationalism
In April 2005, massive anti-Japanese demonstrations swept through China, caused 
by several factors, such as the history issue, and ultimately triggered by the fact that 
Japan had expressed the wish to become a permanent member of the United Nations 
Security Council.  This was clearly a clash of emerging nationalism in both countries, 
which has been on the rise for the past years.  Japan, on the one hand, is trying to be-
come a “normal” country and discard the shadows of the past.  In China on the other 
hand, a state-led nationalism has been promoted as the ideology of Marxism–Lenin-
ism has faded with the end of the Cold War.
Japan’s powerful pre-war nationalism was abolished after 1945 and replaced with 
an economic nationalism.  The success of the economy and the fact that Japan was a 
world leader in the ﬁelds of science and technology made the nation proud and ﬁlled 
the gap that the abolishment of political nationalism had left.  Only after the Cold 
War, with the rise of a new generation of conservative leaders and encouraged by an 
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enduring recession, has there emerged a new form of nationalism.
One example of this new nationalism is the discussion on revising Article 9 of the 
Constitution.21)  Although the discussion about Article 9 has continued for many years 
and the Japanese government has always found ways to circumvent the article, for ex-
ample, through the laws that allowed the SDF to be sent to Iraq, the revision process 
has become more lively in recent years.  When the Japanese constitution celebrated 
its sixtieth anniversary in May 2007, Prime Minister Abe conﬁrmed his ambitions to 
make the revision of the constitution one of the major goals of his administration.
Another example in this context is the fact that the Japan Defense Agency ( JDA) 
was made into a full ministry, the Ministry of Defense in January 2007.  This was seen 
as a further step by many analysts for Japan to abolish the postwar defense guidelines 
and to adopt a more proactive stance in security matters.22)
When Abe gave his ﬁrst address before parliament, he pledged to work towards 
creating a “beautiful” Japan, which should be founded on traditional Japanese values. 
Abe even published a book on this subject, entitled “Towards a Beautiful Country.  My 
Vision for Japan.”  He also stated his plans to change the existing Fundamental Law of 
Education in order to introduce more patriotic content in education, so that students 
would adopt a more positive image about their home country.
The Japanese public and even the ruling LDP are divided over the aforementioned 
issues.  The revision of the constitution, especially, remains a very sensitive topic.  The 
major losses that the LDP and their coalition partner Komeito suffered during the Up-
per House elections in August 2007 may also be due to the fact that the voters were 
displeased with Abe’s priorities.  With the lost majority in the upper house, revising 
the constitution will become even more difﬁcult.  How Abe’s successor Fukuda han-
dles these issues remains to be seen, but he has exhibited a cautious stance concerning 
the revision of the constitution.
In China, nationalism has also been on the rise for the past two decades.  Up to the 
present, the Chinese government has been able to control the masses, mostly through 
restriction and censorship.  The fact that living conditions have improved for many 
Chinese due to the economic development also aided the government in this task. 
Once the economic boom slows down, however, the public is likely to become less 
supportive of one-party rule.  The Chinese leadership thus views nationalism as a use-
ful tool to increase its own legitimacy.23)  China introduced a large campaign of patri-
otic education in the 1990s to compensate for the loss of the Marxist–Leninist ideology 
as a source of legitimacy.  Chinese nationalism takes various forms, one of them being 
an anti-foreign nationalism.  This form is partly due to the negative experiences of 
China during the “Century of Humiliation,” when China suffered under the hands of 
Western and Japanese imperialism.24)  Anti-foreign nationalism, supported by the gov-
ernment, has surfaced on several occasions.  When the United States Air Force acci-
dentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, there were massive anti-
American protests.  The same occurred when an American spy plane collided with a 
Chinese jet in 2001.  But the anti-foreign nationalism is more often directed towards 
Japan.  A form of anti-Japanese feelings is kept alive by the state-run media in China. 
Visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the textbook issue, and the Senkaku Island incidents all 
have sparked massive protest directed against Japan that often turned violent.  Usually 
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these protests are at ﬁrst supported by the Chinese government and even encouraged 
by the state-run media.  But since China’s leaders are always afraid that the protests 
could get out of hand, they usually calm down the masses once they have let off some 
steam.  These anti-Japanese feelings have grown over the years and increased the fear 
of a “China Threat” in Japan and other foreign countries, which is the reason why a 
small group of Chinese intellectuals criticize this practice.
As can be seen in the foregoing, the growing nationalism in both countries un-
doubtedly increases the difﬁculties that Japan and China face in improving their rela-
tions.
3.  Conﬁdence Building Measures between Japan and China
As shown above, the relations between the two main actors in Northeast Asia are 
strained and remain difﬁcult mainly because of the lack of trust between them.  In or-
der to improve the overall relations the ﬁrst step should therefore be to enhance the 
trust between Japan and China.  This could be achieved through CBMs, which Ralph 
Cossa deﬁnes as:
… both formal and informal measures, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilater-
al, that address, prevent or resolve uncertainties among states, including both 
military and political elements 25)
There are several categories of CBMs: declaratory measures, such as non-attack agree-
ments, transparency measures, including information, notiﬁcation and communication 
measures, and, ﬁnally, constraint measures, such as risk reduction regimes or con-
straints on personnel and equipment.26)  Conﬁdence-building measures in the military 
sector can be used to reduce the threat of conﬂict and to ease tensions.  But CBMs do 
not necessarily have to be limited to the military sector.  They can also include politi-
cal and cultural aspects.
China has approached CBMs, especially ones in the military sector, with great cau-
tion.  While CBMs were already common in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact or through the OSCE during the 1970s, these measures were frowned upon in 
China as something only feasible in the West.  This attitude began to change in the 
late 1980s.  One example of this change of conduct is China’s handling of transparen-
cy measures.  China for a long time refused to publish a Defense White Paper because 
the Chinese government saw the publishing of information concerning the military as 
a threat to national security.  Only after international pressure became immense did 
Beijing publish a White Paper on National Defense in 1998.  Since then, each Chinese 
White Paper has become a bit more revealing, although critics argue that China still 
lags behind in terms of accuracy.
Oddly, although by now China is very much engaged in CBMs with other nations, 
it seems reluctant to conduct such measures with Japan.  In the ﬁeld of military diplo-
macy, for example, the PLA is participating in a variety of exchanges, ranging from 
the dispatch of high-level military personnel to the hosting of foreign ofﬁcers at the 
National Defense University in Beijing.27)  In addition, the Chinese Navy is involved 
in combined naval exercises with several foreign navies, even including former adver-
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saries such as Vietnam.  In contrast, Chinese leaders are still reluctant to cooperate 
with the Japanese military, also because this implies the acceptance of the SDF as a le-
gitimate national army, which China does not want to acknowledge.28)  For example, 
there have been no reciprocal visits of naval ships between China and Japan so far.
This procedure is quite typical for China: where it sees advantages through CBMs, 
it is not hesitant to use them.  China made frequent use of CBMs in order to solve 
border disputes with its direct neighbors in Central Asia, which led to troop reductions 
and helped the military cut costs.  Yet in cases where the advantages are not so appar-
ent, for example, in disputes with Japan, China does not use CBMs so willingly.29)
Things look a bit better concerning the exchange of military personnel, though.
Over the past decades, there have been several mutual visits of high-level defense 
ofﬁcials between the two countries.  For example, the PLA chief of staff visited Tokyo 
in 2000, while the chief of the Japanese Air-SDF visited China the same year.  During 
these reciprocal visits, a wide range of topics were covered, but no substantial agree-
ments where entered into.  These visits also came to a halt when the history issue 
ﬂared up again in 2001 and 2002.  They where only taken up again in November 
2006, when a high-level PLA delegation visited Japan.  An important step was the visit 
of China’s Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan to Japan in August 2007, the ﬁrst visit by 
a Chinese Defense Minister in almost a decade.  During this meeting the decision was 
reached to negotiate a military hotline and to arrange a visit of a Chinese warship to 
Japan, among other matters.  The port call of the chinese vessel took place in Novem-
ber 2008.
Even though not many CBMs have taken place between Japan and China, there 
have been a few steps in the right direction.  One of them is the Japanese-Chinese se-
curity dialogue, which was initiated in 1993.  In these meetings, topics included conﬁ-
dence building through enhanced transparency and nuclear proliferation, among oth-
ers.  The security dialogue met once a year up to 2000, when the next meeting was 
delayed until 2002 because of the Yasukuni issue.  This is one of the problems of the 
security dialogue: “Just at a time of conﬂict of interests when the need for enhancing 
mutual understanding and reducing the political temperature is most needed, China 
reduces, or even suspends, political and security dialogue.” 30)
Another promising CBM is the people-to-people exchange.  This form is especially 
useful to help overcome prejudice and misperceptions.  Japan and China have initiat-
ed the “Japan-China 21st Century Friendship Program” in 2006, which promotes the 
exchange of high school and university students.  In the ﬁrst year, approximately 
1,200 Chinese students went to Japan while 150 Japanese students went to China. 
This could be an excellent way of enhancing mutual understanding of entire genera-
tions who will include the leaders of tomorrow.
Concerning the history issue, Japan and China agreed to start a joined research 
project on the history of the two countries, in which scholars from both sides will take 
part.  This too is an important step towards a better understanding.  The Joint History 
Study Group had its second meeting in March 2007.  The scholars agreed to publish 
articles on such topics as Yasukuni Shrine by June 2008.
Another way of increasing mutual understanding could be reached through Track 
Two initiatives between Japan and China.  Track Two initiatives are interactions be-
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tween individuals or groups that occur outside ofﬁcial government channels.  Track 
Two processes have been on the rise in the Asia-Paciﬁc region for the last decade. 
One example is the Track Two counterpart of the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), called 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Paciﬁc (CSCAP), which consists of schol-
ars and other non-governmental security specialists, as well as government ofﬁcials in 
their “private capacity,” who meet regularly, form working groups, and prepare re-
ports to inform and inﬂuence their ofﬁcial counterparts.31)  These working groups cov-
er such ﬁelds as maritime cooperation or CBMs.  Although Japan is a founding mem-
ber of the CSCAP and China joined later, due to the multilateral nature of this 
initiative, it is only partially suitable for improving the bilateral relations of the two 
countries.  But CSCAP shows that Track Two initiatives can be useful in reducing ten-
sions and, at least to some extend, can help prevent a crisis.32)  Further, a Track Two 
approach could be especially useful in overcoming imbroglios such as territorial dis-
putes, where the ofﬁcial stance of the involved governments make it difﬁcult to discuss 
new ideas and scenarios.
4.  Conclusion
Japan and China are the main actors in Northeast Asia.  A peaceful and stable rela-
tionship between the two countries is in the interest of the entire region.  Even though 
the economic relations between Japan and China are as strong as ever, the political 
and security relations lag far behind.  During the Koizumi Administration, Sino-Japa-
nese relations were severely damaged.  The fact that Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Chi-
na in October 2006 was the ﬁrst visit of a Japanese Prime Minister since Prime Minis-
ter Obuchi Keizo¯’s visit in 1998 shows how severe this damage was.
The main goal of the two countries should therefore be to mend their damaged re-
lations as quickly as possible.  One way of achieving this is through CBMs.  The Abe 
Administration undertook the right steps on this matter.  The fact that Fukuda was 
elected as Abe’s successor gives hope that more will be done in this regard.  But China 
also has to do its part.  China should not only use CBMs when it sees a clear advan-
tage in doing so.  Suspending CBMs when conﬂict arises and they therefore are most 
needed is counterproductive and a wrong approach to CBMs.  China should acknowl-
edge the fact that CBMs have worked in improving China’s relationships with many 
of its neighbors, and they could similarly improve China’s relationship with Japan.
Further research concerning the Sino-Japanese relations could include the decipher-
ing of the national images.33)  Annual Japanese government opinion polls on Japanese 
sentiments toward China reveal that the percentage of people not feeling close to Chi-
na have rapidly increased over the last ﬁve years.34)  This also is the case on the Chi-
nese side, where the picture the Chinese public has of Japan is even worse.35)  These 
mutual perceptions seem to be a key aspect in the Sino-Japanese relations.  Why the 
people of these two nations view each other with such suspicion would be an interest-
ing topic for further research.
2008 will see the thirtieth Anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship be-
tween Japan and China.  This presents a golden opportunity to enhance the coopera-
tion between the two countries and initiate further CBMs.  Good relations between 
the two countries are more important than ever.  Hopefully, one day Japan and China 
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will in fact be two countries separated only by a narrow strip of water.
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